

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 347

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0186

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AMBASSADOR QUARLES JULY 17, 1974

PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

BEGIN SUMMARY. AFTER MAKING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NATO ALLIES,(SEE SEPTTEL), NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR QUARLES ANSWERED QUESTIONS FROM AMONG ABOUT 30 MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDING PRESS CONFERENCE. HIS RESPONSE SHOWED THAT WEST MAINTAINS ITS POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND ALSO CONVEYED PICTURE OF ALLIED EFFORTS DURING PAST NEGOTIATION ROUND TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE, ADDRESS CONCERNS OF OTHER SIDE, AND APPROACH COMPLEX TASK STEP BY STEP. TEXT OF Q'S AND A'S FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.

AMBASSADOR QUARLES PRESS CONFERENCE, Q'S AND A'S, JULY 17, 1974

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1. Q. (CBS) ARE YOU DISAPPOINTED OVER THE FAILURE TO REACH SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT ON A FIRST PHASE?

A. WELL, I CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REPORT SOME MORE PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SENSE OF A CONCEPTUAL AGREEMENT, BUT NEVERTHELESS I THINK THAT WE HAVE DONE FAIRLY WELL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. Q. (AP) HAS THE OTHER SIDE GIVEN YOU ANY INDICATION, ANY HOPE, ABOUT THE AGREEMENT THAT AMERICAN AND SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE CUT FIRST. IT SEEMS THAT YOU ARE 100 PERCENT APART ON THIS ISSUE. IS THIS A CORRECT ASSESSMENT?

A. THE SITUATION IS STILL THAT THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST ON REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET. IN THAT RESPECT THERE IS NO CHANGE, NO ALTERATION IN BASIC CONCEPTIONS, IN BASIC PROPOSALS AS THEY HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD ORIGINALLY.

3. Q. (PRESSE) MR. AMBASSADOR, SPEAKING OF YOUR TWO-PHASE PROGRAM, COULD YOU IMAGINE THE FIRST PHASE AS A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PROMISE TO GET THEIR ARMED FORCES REDUCED IN A SECOND PHASE?

A. IN DEALING WITH THAT WHOLE TWO-PHASED PROGRAM OF OURS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THIS CONCEPTION CAUSES CONCERN ON THE OTHER SIDE AS TO WHAT IS THE EXACT NATURE OF THE LINK BETWEEN THESE TWO PHASES. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE WILL BE A SECOND PHASE AND WHETHER IT WILL HAVE AN OUTCOME. IT IS ON THESE POINTS THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS, SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND BE CONSTRUCTIVE, SO THAT THEY WILL HAVE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE A SECOND PHASE AND THAT THIS SECOND PHASE WILL DEAL WITH REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, IT IS IN THIS PHASE THAT REDUCTIONS WILL FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

4. Q. (RUETERS) IN FOLLOWING THIS UP, I WAS INTERESTED IN THE USE OF YOUR WORDS HERE, THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION

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IN A SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND A FURTHER REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT YOU WILL TAKE ALL MEASURES TO ASSURE THAT A SECOND PHASE WILL HAVE SUCCESS. HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO ASSURE THE OTHER SIDE THAT ALL NINE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE TWO IN THE FIRST PHASE WOULD INDEED MAKE REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE?

A. AS FAR AS THE ISSUES WE ARE DEALING WITH ARE CONCERNED, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD TO PUT THE QUESTION TO MY COLLEAGUE MR. STRULAK THIS MORNING, NAMELY WHETHER HE BELIEVES THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WILL REDUCE IN PHASE TWO. THIS OF COURSE IS ONE OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE, BUT I DON'T THINK I CAN GO ANY FURTHER INTO THE ACTUAL SUBSTANCE OF THE EXACT NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE, NOR SAY HOW FAR THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE AWAY CONCERNS ON THEIR SIDE. THERE HAS THUS FAR BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. I THINK THAT MR. STRULAK ALSO SAID THIS MORNING THAT THEY HAD MAINTAINED THEIR BASIC VIEW, CONCEPTION AND BASIC PLAN, THAT IS TO SAY REDUCTION BY ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST PHASE. WE ON OUR SIDE HAVE MAINTAINED THE POSITION THAT WE CANNOT GO BEYOND REDUCTIONS OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE; REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE MUST REMAIN LIMITED TO UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION GROUND FORCES. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND THAT LINE, BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE CONCERNS WHICH THIS POSITION CREATES. WE ARE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS WITH REGARD TO OUR FORCES.

5. Q. (RUETERS) THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS, MR. AMBASSADOR, THAT THESE FIRST-PHASE PROPOSALS BY THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT NOW BE REGARDED WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY; THE SPREADING OR STAGGERING OF THE REDUCTIONS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, POSSIBLY STARTING WITH THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION. HAVE YOU ANY COMMENT ON THAT? AND HOW DOES THAT STRIKE YOU AS A POSSIBILITY?

A. WELL, I DON'T THINK I COULD GO INTO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH THE OTHER SIDE HAS MADE IN EFFORTS TO TRY TO FIND MIDDLE GROUND. THEIR COMPROMISE SOLUTION, THEY CALL IT UNCLASSIFIED

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A FIRST STEP, THE IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS THEY HAVE MADE IN RESPECT SHOW RESOURCEFULNESS. BUT IN OUR OPINION THEY SEEM AT THIS TIME NOT TO GO FAR ENOUGH TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS OF WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE AN OBJECTIVE MIDDLE GROUND. INSISTENCE ON REDUCTION BY ALL FROM THE OUTSET DEFINITELY PREJUDICES THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE HAVE QUITE CLEARLY STATED THAT WHILST WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS WITH REGARD TO OUR GROUND FORCES WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND THAT AND HAVE THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ACCEPT REDUCTIONS ON OUR GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE, HOWEVER SMALL THEY MAY BE.

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FROM US REP MBFR

6. Q. (AP) HAVE THE WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS, OR ANY ONE OF THE WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS, EVER SUGGESTED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE REDUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES THERE COULD BE THE ADDITION OF AT LEAST ONE OTHER PARTICIPANT ON EACH SIDE. HAS THIS EVER FORMALLY BEEN SUGGESTED?

A. I DON' REALLY WANT TO GO INTO THE INTRICACIES OF IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE. I THINK IT SHOULD SUFFICE TO KNOW WHERE THE CONCERNS LIE ON EITHER SIDE. IN THESE TALKS, WHICH ARE MAINLY INFORMAL TALKS, THERE ARE CERTAIN STRAWS IN THE WIND, BUT THEY HAVE NO FORMAL STATUS. IT IS ONLY WHEN YOU INCLUDE THEM IN A PLENARY STATEMENT THAT THEY ACQUIRE SUBSTANCE AND BECOME MORE OR LESS FORMAL PROPOSALS. AND THEREFORE I DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TO TRY TO DEFINE THEM OR GO INTO THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND GIVE PRECISE ANSWERS ON THIS POINT. I THINK WE HAVE EXPLAINED VERY CLEARLY THAT WE WEST EUROPEANS CANNOT ACCEPT REDUCTIONS NOW, AS THIS COULD CODIFY AND STABILIZE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS ONE OF IMBALANCE. IT IS OUR FIRM OBJECTIVE AND WILL REMAIN OUR FIRM OBJECTIVE TO CREATE IN CENTRAL EUROPE A NEW SITUATION, - A SITUATION WHICH IS BASED ON DETENTE, OR COOPERATION, AND SUCH A SITUATION, IF IT IS GOING TO BE CODIFIED AND CONSECRATED IN A TREATY -- AND IT WILL BE INCORPORATED IN A TREATY -- IN SUCH A SITUATION CANNOT BE ANY OTHER BUT A SITUATION OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA. WE ARE NOT DEALING WITH THIS REDUCTION PROBLEM IN A SITUATION OF COLD WAR AND CONFRONTATION; WE ARE DEALING WITH IT IN A SITUATION OF DETENTE AND ONE OF TRYING TO BUILD UP COOPERATION. WE ARE TRYING TO DEFINE THE MILITARY CONDITIONS OF THAT SITUATION IN OUR MBFR TREATY. AND FOR THAT REASON THE OUTCOME CAN ONLY BE ONE OF EQUALITY OF FORCE RELATIONSHIPS FOR BOTH SIDES.

7. Q.(PRAVDA) IT WAS VERY INTERESTING TO NOTE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HOLLAND ABOUT A 20 PCT REDUCTION IN ITS ARMED FORCES. AND A SECOND QUESTION: SINCE SUCH INITIATIVE WAS DISPLAYED BY HOLLAND CONCERNING REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHY CANNOT HOLLAND PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING?

A. I WAS EXPECTING THAT QUESTION. TO START WITH, THE PLANS OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAVE RECEIVED QUITE WIDE PUBLICITY. THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE QUITE CLEARLY DEPENDENT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SO THEY WILL NOT BE PUT INTO PRACTICE BEFORE WE KNOW FULLY WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN UNDER MBFR. AND I THINK THIS ALSO ANSWERS YOUR QUESTION. WE ONLY INTEND TO REDUCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. AT A NATO DPC MEETING RECENTLY AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL WE AFFIRMED THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES SHOULD ONLY REDUCE THEIR FORCES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. APART FROM THIS, IT MAKES A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE WHETHER

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YOU REDUCE UNILATERALLY OR UNDER A TREATY. REDUCING UNDER A TREATY HAS THE CONSEQUENCE, WHICH CAN BE AN ADVANTAGE OR NOT DEPENDING ON HOW YOU LOOK AT IT, OF MAKING A SITUATION RIGID; OF MAKING IT A FIXED SITUATION AND

COMMITMENT.

8. Q. (PRESSE) COULD THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FREEZE THEIR FORCES AND TO REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE?

A. I READ YOUR ARTICLE ON THIS. TO START WITH, I DON'T THINK I CAN COMMENT ON SPECULATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED ON THIS POINT, BUT I CAN SAY THAT ONE OF THE CONCERNS WHICH THE EASTERN SIDE EXPRESSED ABOUT THE WESTERN TOW-PHASED PROPOSAL WAS THAT IF ALL DO NOT PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET, DOES THAT MEAN THAT THOSE WHO DO NOT PARTICIPATE WILL BE FREE IN THE MEANTIME TO INCREASE THEIR FORCE LEVELS. THIS IS A PROBLEM, AND WE HAVE MADE SUGGESTIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE TO MEET THIS CONCERN IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT. AND WE HOPE THAT WHAT WE HAVE SAID MEETS THEIR CONCERNS. THE EXACT MANNER IN WHICH THIS PROBLEM COULD BE DEALT WITH HAS NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC, AND I DON'T THINK IT WOULD SERVE MUCH OF A USEFUL PURPOSE TO COMMENT ON HOW WE HAVE TRIED TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.

9. Q. (WASHINGTON POST) IN YOUR JUDGMENT, SINCE EASTER, HAVE YOU MADE PROGRESS ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FIRST?

A. WELL, WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED PROGRESS IN THE SENSE THAT WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION. HOWEVER, WE HAVE PURSUED THIS QUESTION WHEREBY THE WHOLE MATTER HAS BEEN BROKEN DOWN INTO ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS. THE WHOLE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CONFERENCE IS A MATTER OF FACT BEING DEALT WITH IN A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, BY TRYING TO TAKE EACH ISSUE IN ITS SEQUENCE. AND WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ACTUAL PROBLEM NOW FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME. WE HAVE ACHIEVED MUCH GREATER CLARITY AS TO WHAT ARE THE CONCERNS OF EACH SIDE WITH EACH OTHER'S PROPOSALS. AS I HAVE SAID, WE HAVE PUT FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS TO

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DEAL WITH THESE CONCERNS. WE HOPE THAT IN THE SUMMER RECESS THEY WILL BE EVALUATED. PERHAPS WHEN WE RESUME HERE, THEY MAY LEAD TO A MORE POSITIVE LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM, AND THAT IN THE EARLY STAGES AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS OR BY THE END OF THE YEAR WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED SOME CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH, AS MR. KISSINGER TERMS IT. BECAUSE THIS IS DEFINITELY NECESSARY IF WE STILL WISH TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTION BY 1975. THAT IS TO SAY, A YEAR FROM NOW.

10. Q. (20) DO YOU THINK THAT THIS IS STILL IN THE REALM OF

POSSIBILITY, TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTION AGREEMENT BY 1975?

A. ACTUALLY TO BEGIN WITH, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE OUR AGREEMENT SIGNED BY JULY OF NEXT YEAR, AND THEN IT WOULD HAVE TO BE RATIFIED. BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE A GREAT STEP FORWARD IF WE COULD HAVE A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT BY 1975, AND THAT IS DEFINITELY OUR TARGET.

11. Q. (RUETERS) WHAT SORT OF TIME FRAME DO YOU ENVISAGE BETWEEN PHASE ONE AND PHASE TWO? ASSUMING THAT PHASE I IS SUCCESSFUL, THAT IS.

A. WELL, THAT IS ALSO A PROBLEM WHICH IS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER SIDE. I WOULD SUPPOSE FIRST THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE RATIFIED, CERTAIN ACTIONS SHOULD BE SET INTO MOTION. THESE ARE ALL PROBLEMS THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH THE OTHER SIDE. WE ARE DEFINITELY PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF HOW LONG THE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE.

12. Q. HAVE YOU A CONCEPT, YOUR OWN IDEA OF THE LENGTH OF THIS PERIOD? COULD ONE TALK ABOUT ONE YEAR, FIVE YEARS? WHAT SORT OF INTERVAL WOULD THERE BE?

A. DO YOU MEAN HOW LONG A SECOND PHASE WOULD LAST? (Q. NO, I MEAN BETWEEN THE FIRST PHASE AND THE SECOND PHASE.) A. THERE IS NO FIRM VIEW AS FAR AS A MINIMUM OR MAXIMUM IS CONCERNED. I THINK IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED AT A STEADY PACE.

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FROM US REP MBFR

13. Q. (CBS) IN OTHER WORDS, THE TWO PHASES ARE TIED IN TOGETHER?

A. THERE ARE DEFINITELY, IN OUR CONCEPTION, TWO SEPARATE DISTINCT PHASES. THERE SHOULD BE EVENTUALLY APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, AND WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE OTHER SIDE AT WHAT LEVEL WE CONCEIVE OF THIS COMMON CEILING AS AN INDICATION, WHICH OF COURSE IS ALSO SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SO ONE WOULD HAVE, IN CONCLUDING THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, QUITE DEFINITE IDEAS ABOUT THE SECOND PHASE. I FEEL HOWEVER THAT ONE SHOULD NOT TRY TO DEAL WITH TOO MANY PHASE II QUESTIONS NOW. I SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE ENOUGH TO SOLVE AS IT IS.

14. Q. (ISVESTIYA) YOU MENTION ONLY REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES. BUT THE FORCES CONSIST OF MANY OTHER ELEMENTS. FOR UNCLASSIFIED

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INSTANCE, SECRETARY SCHLESINGER SAID IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE THAT NATO FORCES CONSIST OF WHAT HE CALLS "TRIADS" TECHNICAL, TACTICAL AND GROUND FORCES. AND ABOUT THE QUESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA: IN THE SAME ARTICLE IT WAS SAID THAT THE US HAS SO-CALLED DUAL-BASED CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD REINTRODUCE FORCES ON SHORT NOTICE.

A. I HAVE ALREADY IN MY LAST STATEMENT AT EASTER TRIED TO DWELL AT SOME LENGTH ON THIS PROBLEM. WE CONCEIVE OF THE IMBALANCE IN EUROPE DEFINITELY IN TERMS OF GROUND FORCES. WE HAVE GIVEN YOU THE FIGURES -- THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES DISPOSE ACCORDING TO OUR DATA OF 150,000 MEN MORE THAN WE DO IN THIS AREA. AND IN VIEW OF THE GOAL WE HAVE SET OURSELVES, TO ACHIEVE IN THIS AREA OF EUROPE A RELATIONSHIP OF APPROXIMATE PARITY, WE CONSIDER THAT IT IS THE TASK OF THIS CONFERENCE TO TRY TO ELIMINATE THE POSSIBLE CAUSES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT IS THIS IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES WHICH WE CONSIDER AS DESTABILIZING AND CONTAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF

CONFLICT. A CONFLICT COULD ESCALATE TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WE WISH TO PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT AND THEREBY THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR FORCES. BECAUSE IN A SITUATION OF MORE OR LESS OVERALL NUCLEAR PARITY IN THE WORLD, IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT A CONFLICT IN EUROPE WOULD START WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE COULD ONLY EVER BE USED IN A SITUATION OF ESCALATION OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMED FORCES, WHEREBY THE ESCALATION THEN TAKES PLACE. AND THEREFORE WE HAVE CONCENTRATED THE WHOLE EFFORT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON ELIMINATING THIS CAUSE OF INSTABILITY AND THEREBY CREATE A SITUATION WHEREBY THIS CENTRAL EUROPE, IN WHICH SO OFTEN IN THE PAST WARS HAVE STARTED WHICH HAVE GROWN INTO WORLD CONFLICT, A SITUATION IS CREATED WHERE WE KNOW AND PRACTICALLY ARE SURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONFLICT. THEREFORE WE CAN BE ASSURED THAT THESE NCULEAR WEAPONS WHICH ARE THERE WILL NOT BE USED.

15. Q. (FINANCIAL TIMES) DON'T YOU THINK THAT YOU HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALSO OTHER CONFLICT SITUATIONS AND UNCLASSIFIED

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THEIR NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON THE TALKS? I WOULD MENTION FIRST YOUR OWN GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS TO CUT DUTCH FORCES AND VARIOUS FACILITIES, WHICH HAVE BEEN MOST SHARPLY CONDEMNED BY NATO, AND ALSO BY A PART OF THE WESTERN PRESS, AND SECONDLY, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO FLANK STATES, GREECE AND TURKEY.

A. I HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED ON THE SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS. I HAVE SAID THAT THESE PLANS OF REDUCTIONS ARE BEING MADE DEPENDENT ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THESE PLANS DO HARM THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE ANOTHER SITUATION IF THE NEGHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT INTRODUCED THIS PROVISION WITH REGARD TO MBFR. THIS PROVISION WAS ALREADY WORKED IN FROM THE BEGINNING, AND THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IS QUITE AWARE OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD NOT WISH TO HAMPER THEIR PROGRESS AND THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS. AS TO THE OTHER QUESTION, I THINK IT IS QUITE OUTSIDE MY COMPETENCE TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT A POSSIBLE CONFLICT. I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL BE SETTLED VERY SOON.

16. Q. (WASHINGTON POST) WHAT EFFECTS, IF ANY, DID THE NIXON-BREZHNEV TALKS HAVE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE?

A. THE TALKS INCLUDED MBFR, THEY UNDERLINED THE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE WHICH IS ATTACHED BY BOTH THE SUPER POWERS TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT NO DECISIONS ABOUT THE SUBJECT MATTER WERE TAKEN. WE WERE ALSO GIVEN

FULL ASSURANCE IN ADVANCE BY THE US THAT NO DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED.

17. Q. (CBS) MR. AMBASSADOR, I NOTICE THAT IN THE TITLE OF YOUR STATEMENT YOU USE MBFR. I UNDERSTAND THAT "BALANCED" WAS REMOVED AT THE REQUEST OF THE RUSSIANS. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THAT?

A. WE ON THE WESTERN SIDE CONTINUE TO USE THIS TITLE FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. CONCERNING DOCUMENTS, FOR INSTANCE THIS ONE HERE ON THE COMMUNIQUE, WE DO REFER TO MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
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(IT SEEMS THAT YOU HAVE TWO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS: THE RUSSIANS CLAIM THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE WORD "BALANCED" AS WE DO.) I THINK THAT WE ARE BOTH TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A BALANCE, AND THAT IS REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CREATE BETTER BALANCE, BETTER STABILITY THAT IS, AND THAT IS CLOSELY RELATED. SO I PRESUME THAT OUR RUSSIAN FRIENDS FELT THAT BY ACCEPTING THAT WORD, THIS WOULD BE PREJUDGING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IT IS VERY OBVIOUS TO US THAT WE MUST CREATE IN EUROPE A BALANCED SITUATION, NO MATTER WHAT WORDS YOU USE FOR IT.
END TEXT.RESOR

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